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Abstract Stimuli related to an individual’s knowledge/
experience are often more memorable than abstract stimuli,
particularly for older adults. This has been found when mate-
rial that is congruent with knowledge is contrasted with ma-
terial that is incongruent with knowledge, but there is little
research on a possible graded effect of congruency. The pres-
ent study manipulated the degree of congruency of study
material with participants’ knowledge. Young and older par-
ticipants associated two famous names to nonfamous faces,
where the similarity between the nonfamous faces and the real
famous individuals varied. These associations were incremen-
tally easier to remember as the name–face combinations be-
came more congruent with prior knowledge, demonstrating a
graded congruency effect, as opposed to an effect based
simply on the presence or absence of associations to prior
knowledge. Older adults tended to show greater susceptibility
to the effect than young adults, with a significant age differ-
ence for extreme stimuli, in line with previous literature show-
ing that schematic support in memory tasks particularly ben-
efits older adults.
Keywords Aging andmemory . Recognition . Schemas .
Face-name associations
Memory for a given stimulus can vary depending on an
individual’s knowledge and experience with the to-be-
remembered material. Chase and Simon (1973) demonstrated
that expert chess players were better able to memorize ar-
rangements of pieces in chess games than were novice chess
players. Similarly, music experts have been shown to have
better memory for passages of text about music than do
nonmusic experts (Arbuckle, Vanderleck, Harsany, &
Lapidus, 1990), architects have been shown to have better
visuospatial working memory than do nonarchitects
(Cavallini, Cornoldi, & Vecchi, 2009), and pilots have been
shown to have superior memory for aviation-related material
than do nonpilots (Morrow, Menard, Stine-Morrow, Teller, &
Bryant, 2001). On a more general basis, it has also been
shown that vocabulary level is positively correlated with word
memory ability (see, e.g., Hultsch, Hertzog, & Dixon, 1990).
The above studies are based on individual differences, but
there are also many circumstances in which material that is
congruent with knowledge/experience is more easily remem-
bered than material that is incongruent with knowledge/
experience. For example, this occurs with recall of words
and nonwords (Hulme, Maughan, & Brown, 1991), recogni-
tion of possible and impossible line drawings of objects
(Schacter, Cooper, & Valdiserri, 1992), cued recall of related
and unrelated word pairs (Badham, Estes, & Maylor, 2012),
and cued recall of related and unrelated picture pairs (Sharps
& Antonelli, 1997). It should also be noted that there are
studies showing better memory for novel stimuli compared
with familiar stimuli (e.g., the bizarreness effect, Gounden &
Nicolas, 2012; McDaniel, Einstein, DeLosh, May, & Brady,
1995). However, novel/distinctive material is generally only
more memorable when it is contrasted with familiar material
within a given memory set (Hunt, 1995), and blocked novel
stimuli infrequently show special mnemonic properties
(Schmidt, 1991).
The notion that knowledge/experience can support memo-
ry processes has been widely explored in the context of
cognitive aging. A variety of studies have shown that knowl-
edge/experience can provide schematic support that dispro-
portionately benefits older adults’ memory relative to that of
young adults. Early studies using paired-associates tasks
showed that age deficits in memory are alleviated with strong-
ly associated words, relative to weakly associated words
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(Canestrari, 1966; Kausler & Lair, 1966). More recently, age
deficits in memory for associations between words have been
alleviated by semantic relations between to-be-remembered
words (Badham et al., 2012; Naveh-Benjamin, Hussain,
Guez, & Bar-On, 2003). This pattern of results extends
beyond word pairs. Smith, Park, Earles, Shaw, and Whiting
(1998) tested young and older adults’memory for associations
between pairs of related and unrelated pictures. Age deficits in
memory were reduced when the pictures were related to each
other, compared with when they were unrelated. Castel (2005)
tested young and older adults’ memory for fictional prices of
items that were either realistic (e.g., broccoli $1.89) or unre-
alistic (e.g., pickles $17.89). Age interacted with price type
such that there was an age-related memory deficit for the
unrealistic prices but not for the realistic prices. Similarly,
McGillivray and Castel (2010) found age deficits in memory
for unrealistic ages of faces but not for realistic ages of faces.
Although there is evidence for disproportionate schematic
support of older adults’ memory, some studies show age
invariance in the support of memory by schematic knowledge.
Arbuckle et al. (1990) found that young and older music
experts had superior memory for music passages compared
with passages about dogs, whereas young and older nonmusic
experts did not. Expertise benefitted the two age groups to the
same extent. Similar results were found with young and older
individuals who varied in cooking expertise and who memo-
rized passages related or unrelated to cooking (Miller, 2003).
Light and Anderson (1983) tested young and older adults’
memory for scripts describing typical and atypical actions, but
age deficits in memory were similar across script types. These
conflicting results indicate that it is important to develop
further insight into how schematic support benefits memory
in young and older adults.
The majority of studies investigating schematic support of
memory have used highly contrasting material that is either
consistent or inconsistent with participants’ knowledge/
experience. One factor that has been overlooked is the effect
of incremental changes in the consistency of stimulus material
with an individual’s knowledge. The present article attempts
to clarify whether degree of congruency with knowledge is
important, as opposed to simply the presence or absence of
prior representations of a stimulus. To our knowledge, only
one paradigm has previously been used to examine
continuous effects of prior knowledge on memory. Hemmer
and Steyvers (2009) tested young adults’ memory for the
presentation size of images of fruits and vegetables on a
computer screen. They found that when participants recon-
structed the sizes of images, they were biased toward the real
size of the food (and its size within the category). For example,
if a pineapple and a raspberry were displayed at the size of a
pear, the raspberry would be remembered as smaller than it
was displayed and the pineapple would be remembered as
larger than it was displayed (for similar results, see Heussen,
Poirier, Hampton, & Aldrovandi, 2011). Thus, only a small
body of evidence exists of a graded benefit to memory on the
basis of degree of congruency with existing knowledge.
The present study adopted a novel paradigm to assess how
incremental changes in the congruency of a stimulus with
prior knowledge would influence the memorability of that
stimulus. Furthermore, the paradigm was based on associative
memory, where older adults have consistently been shown to
have particular deficits relative to young adults (Naveh-Ben-
jamin, 2000; Old & Naveh-Benjamin, 2008). It is hypothe-
sized that prior knowledge/schematic support will dispropor-
tionately benefit older adults’ associative memory relative to
that of young adults. In brief, young and older participants
were required to associate two famous names with a range of
nonfamous faces that varied in their similarity to the famous
individuals. We predicted that more similar name–face com-
binations would be remembered better than less similar name–
face combinations, especially for older adults.
Method
Participants
Forty-eight young adults (33 female, ages 18–27 years, M =
20.0, SD = 1.9) and 48 older adults (33 female, ages 64–
86 years, M = 73.1, SD = 5.4) took part in the experiment.1
Young and older adults had similar years of education, M =
14.6, SD = 1.6, and M = 15.0, SD = 2.8, respectively (t < 1).
Young participants were either recruited from the university
and compensated a small amount, or they participated without
compensation as part of demonstration sessions at open days
for the Department of Psychology. Older adults were recruited
from the local community and were given compensation
toward their travel expenses.
Materials
Stimuli were 16 faces presented on a computer screen above
one of two names. Two highly famous individuals’ names
were used: Prince William (PW) and George Bush (GB). The
faces were all nonfamous individuals, but two faces were
lookalikes for PW and two were lookalikes for GB (lookalike
images were taken from the Internet). The remaining faces
were taken from an online database (Psychological Image
Collection at Stirling; http://pics.psych.stir.ac.uk/). The faces
were of white males who varied in their similarity to PW and
GB.
1 These numbers exclude 4 older adults and 1 young adult who failed to
follow instructions and a further 2 young adults who were not familiar
with the famous individuals referred to in the memory test.
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The two pairs of lookalike faces were always present-
ed with one of each name. That is, for the two PW
lookalikes, one would be randomly presented with the
name PW and the other would be presented with the
name GB (and similarly for the GB lookalikes). For each
participant, the remaining 12 faces were randomly named
either PW or GB under the constraint that each name was
used exactly six times. The order of presentation of faces
was entirely random for each participant.
An independent group of 26 individuals (18 female,
ages 23–78 years, M = 46.5, SD = 22.0, and with M =
17.5, SD = 1.5 years of education) ranked the faces in
terms of their similarity to PW and GB. On a paper-
based questionnaire, they were shown actual pictures of
PW and GB and then were asked to rank the 16
nonfamous faces on the following basis: “Please rank
the following 16 faces to establish if they are more
similar to Prince William or to George Bush. Place a 1
to the right of the face most similar to Prince William
and a 16 to the right of the face most similar to GB, so
that each of the numbers 1–16 is used once.” The rank-
ings were averaged together for each face, to establish
their similarity to PW/GB. The lookalike faces appeared
in the predicted positions, with the PW lookalikes falling
in positions 1 and 2 and the GB lookalikes falling in
positions 15 and 16. Shows the faces in rank order. For
all 16 faces, the mean pairwise rater correlation was .78,
with a 90 % confidence interval of .77–.79. For just the
12 non-lookalike faces, the mean pairwise rater correla-
tion was .50, with a 90 % confidence interval of .47–.52.
Procedure
After we established that each participant was familiar with
PW and GB, participants viewed the 16 nonfamous faces
with the name “Prince William” or “George Bush”
displayed below them. Each face (and name) was shown
for 3 s and a blank white screen was shown for 1 s before
each stimulus. Participants were asked to remember which
name was displayed with each face. Following encoding,
there was a 30-s delay during which participants were
required to respond “true” or “false” to the correctness of
various simple numerical equations (e.g., 5 × 3 = 15: true).
After this delay, a two-alternative forced-choice recognition
memory test took place. Participants were shown each face,
one at a time, in the center of the screen. Below the face, the
names “Prince William” and “George Bush” were
d i sp l ayed on the l e f t and r igh t o f t he sc r een
(counterbalanced across participants). Participants pressed
left and right keys (“F” and “J”) to indicate which name
they remembered being shown with the face in the
encoding phase. Participants were informed of the test
structure before they began the study phase.
Results
Initially, performance was assessed for the lookalike faces.
The proportion of correct responses for remembering the
name associated to each lookalike face was calculated. These
responses were then categorized as congruent (e.g., remem-
bering that the name PW was originally displayed with a
lookalike for PW) or incongruent (e.g., remembering that the
name GB was originally displayed with a lookalike for PW).
A 2 (Age: young, older) × 2 (Congruency: congruent, incon-
gruent) repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA)was
conducted on the accuracy data (see Fig. 1 for means). There
was a main effect of age [F(1, 94) = 11.35, MSE = 0.10, p <
.01, ηp
2 = .11], with young adults performing better than older
adults. There was a main effect of congruency [F(1, 94) =
12.20, MSE = 0.15, p < .001, ηp
2 = .12], with more accurate
memory for congruent than for incongruent stimuli. There was
also a significant interaction between age and congruency
[F(1, 94) = 4.08, MSE = 0.15, p < .05, ηp
2 = .04], with older
adults showing a larger difference in accuracy between con-
gruent and incongruent stimuli than did young adults. Age
differences were absent for congruent name–face combina-
tions (t < 1) and present for incongruent name–face combina-
tions [t(94) = 3.36, p < .01].
In order to assess the effect of congruency across the whole
data, lines of best fit (slopes and intercepts: y = mx + b) were
estimated for recognition accuracy data after arranging the 16
faces in rank order of their similarity to PW/GB. Along the x-
axis, the face ranked most similar to PW was in Position 1,
with the rank increasing up to Position 16 for the face ranked
most similar to GB. Two sets of lines of best fits were calcu-
lated, one with the y-axis as the probability of recognizing the
name for each face when labeled “PW” at study, and another
with the y-axis as the probability of recognizing the name for
each face when labeled “GB” at study (see Fig. 2a and b).
Maximum likelihood estimation was used to estimate the
slopes and intercepts of the lines of best fit. In a general model,
separate sets of lines were fit for young and older adults’ data,
giving a total of four slopes and four intercepts. The general
model was compared with three restricted models:
1. The first restricted model had the four slopes fixed at zero
(i.e., testing if the slopes improved the fit to the data). A
likelihood-ratio test confirmed that the general model fit
significantly better than the restricted model after taking
into account the extra degrees of freedom in the general
model [χ2(4) = 29.60, p < .001]. This indicated that there
was an effect of congruency in the data, with slopes
showing better memory for more congruent name–face
combinations than for less congruent name–face
combinations.
2. The second restricted model had lines of best fit that were
not allowed to be different for young and older adults (i.e.,
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testing if the two age groups responded differently to the
stimuli). A likelihood-ratio test confirmed that the general
model also fit significantly better than the second restrict-
ed model [χ2(4) = 29.20, p < .001], demonstrating that
young and older adults were responding differently to the
task. This age difference may have been due to general
age deficits in memory, and was investigated further in the
third restricted model.
3. The third restricted model had slopes fixed as the same for
young and older adults but the intercepts were allowed to
vary for each age group (i.e., to test if young and older
adults responded differently to congruency). The general
model fit marginally better than the third restricted model
[χ2(2) = 4.99, p = .08]. The direction of this trend was in
line with our predictions—namely, that older adults, with
data leading to steeper slopes than young adults, were
more affected by congruency.
It is possible that congruency effects were driven by re-
sponses to the lookalike faces, which represented the most
extreme stimuli. To test for this, the general and restricted
models above were fit to the data for non-lookalike faces only
(face ranks 3–14 inclusive in Fig. 2c). The general model fit
the data better than the first restricted model [χ2(4) = 14.82, p
< .01], indicating that congruency was still important for
nonextreme stimuli and that knowledge/experience was
influencing memory performance. The general model fit bet-
ter than the second restricted model [χ2(4) = 21.72, p < .001],
indicating age differences in the data. The general model was
also a marginally better fit than the third restricted model
[χ2(2) = 4.98, p = .08], indicating that older adults were
somewhat more influenced by congruency than were young
adults.
Finally, to investigate the marginal age differences in con-
gruency effects, the general model was compared with the first
restricted model separately for young and older adults to
establish if slopes improved the fit for both age groups. With
the data for all 16 of the faces, the effect of congruency was
marginal for young adults [χ2(2) = 5.08, p = .08], but highly
significant for older adults [χ2(2) = 24.52, p < .001]. With the
data for the non-lookalike faces only, there was a weak con-
gruency trend for young adults [χ2(2) = 3.77, p = .15] and a
significant effect of congruency for older adults [χ2(2) =
11.06, p < .01]. This also suggests that the effect of congru-
ency was stronger in older adults than in young adults.
Discussion
The present data showed that material more congruent with
knowledge/experience can be more easily memorized than
material less congruent with knowledge/experience. This ef-
fect was more pronounced for older adults than for young
adults, in line with some previous findings in the literature
(see, e.g., Castel, 2005; Smith et al., 1998) but not with others
(see, e.g., Arbuckle et al., 1990). Importantly, it occurred in an
incremental fashion, with the probability of correct recogni-
tion positively related to the amount of consistency between
the stimuli and existing knowledge/experience.
The results highlight a tendency for individuals to prefer-
entially remember material that is congruent with their
existing experiences and/or to preferentially forget material
incongruent with their experiences. Such an effect would
cause a bias in how individuals perceive their surroundings,
with a tendency for established concepts to become reinforced
by experience. This mechanism may allow individuals to
more rapidly and accurately perceive and categorize common
stimuli. It may partially explain, for example, why high-
frequency words are more rapidly and accurately identified
than are low-frequency words (Grainger, 1990) and how
expectations based on prior knowledge facilitate the speed
and accuracy of perceiving objects (Bar, 2004).
Previous research has directly compared memory for ma-
terial congruent with knowledge/experience with memory for
material incongruent with knowledge/experience. It is well
established that familiarity with study material can aid mem-
ory. However, the present data demonstrate that this can occur
in an incremental fashion on the basis of the degree of con-
gruency between study materials and knowledge/experience.
This provides evidence for a graded mechanism in which the
amount of congruency with knowledge is important, not just
the presence or absence of congruency with knowledge. This
graded effect of congruency was more evident in older adults
relative to young adults, with older adults showing a signifi-
cant effect but young adults only a marginal effect. To our
knowledge, this study presents the first suggestion of an
incremental change in age-related associative deficits. This
provides important insight into Naveh-Benjamin’s (2000) as-
sociative deficit hypothesis by demonstrating that associative
deficits can be manipulated at a fine-grained level.
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Fig. 1 Memory accuracy for young and older adults for names congruent
or incongruent with lookalikes’ appearances. Error bars are ±1SE
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Older adults may be more influenced by prior knowl-
edge than young adults simply because their knowledge
has been reinforced over many years of experience. This
argument could be applied to studies of semantically
related word pairs (Naveh-Benjamin et al., 2003) in
which older adults have encountered the words together
across their lifetime. However, it is difficult to apply this
argument to the present findings because young and
older adults would not necessarily have had different
exposure to images of George Bush and Prince William.
Another explanation for the pattern of data observed
could be that older adults have a reduced ability to
inhibit prior knowledge (e.g., age-related inhibitory def-
icits; Hasher & Zacks, 1988). When completing the
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Fig. 2 Performance for young and older adults remembering if the names
Prince William (PW) or George Bush (GB) were displayed with each
face, and the model fit to those data. Error bars are ±1SE. a Probability of
correctly recalling that the name PW was shown with each face. b
Probability of correctly recalling that the name GB was shown with each
face. c Face stimuli ranked from 1 (most similar to PW) to 16 (most
similar to GB). *Only one of each pair of lookalikes is presented as an
example
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memory test, older adults may have had difficulty
inhibiting the natural tendency to respond with the name
that more closely matched the test face, rather than the
name that they remembered seeing with the test face.
Future research should aim to clarify how schematic
support differentially affects the memory of young and
older adults and to investigate why it particularly bene-
fits older adults in some paradigms but not in others.
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